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1 a dynamo is an electrical generator. in , adams describes himself as fascinated by the display of dynamos at the great exposition held in Paris in 1900. on the 
one hand, unlike the Virgin, a dynamo extracted power from natural material; on the other, the method of extraction, devised by the human mind, remained 
both material and mysterious. see henry adams (1983); and christopher Perricone (1991). references from , , and  will be to this edition unless otherwise noted.
Without Mary, man had no hope except in Atheism, 
and for Atheism the world was not ready. Hemmed 
back on that side, men rushed like sheep to escape 
the butcher, and were driven to Mary; only too happy 
in finding protection and hope in a being who could 
understand the language they talked, and the excuses 
they had to offer. How passionately they worshipped 
Mary, the Cathedral of Chartres shows; and how this 
worship elevated the whole sex, all the literature 
and history of the time proclaim. If you need more 
proof, you can read more Petrarch; but still one 
cannot realize how actual Mary was, to the men and 
women of the middle-ages, and how she was present, 
as a matter of course, whether by way of miracle or 
as a habit of life, throughout their daily existence. 
The surest measure of her reality is the enormous 
money value they put on her assistance, and the art 
that was lavished on her gratification, but an almost 
equally certain sign is the casual allusion, the chance 
reference to her, which assumes her presence.
Henry Adams (1904)
a
t the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Henry Adams wrote the history of an earlier 
century through the study of what he 
believed to be its major accomplishments 
—Mont Saint Michel, Chartres, the life of 
Francis of Assisi, and the theology of Thomas Aquinas. 
For Adams, the years 1150-1250 expressed the essence of 
a time that was to be fundamentally transformed by the 
forces of modernity. An age is defined, Adams argues, 
by the site from which force emanates; hence his 
distinction, in The Education of Henry Adams (1907), between 
the Virgin— the Mary of the Christian Middle Ages —and 
the dynamo.1 Both, as centers of force, are real.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, I find 
myself preoccupied with the question of what it might 
mean to say that the Virgin is real —actual, present, 
palpable— in one time and place and not in another. 
The question is vital, I think, to writing the history of 
religion. For Adams, history is always the history of 
forces. The Virgin was a force; hence the Virgin was 
real. In positing the reality of the Virgin in the Middle 
Ages, Adams suggests her veridicality; she exists in 
the world, able to effect the actions of human beings. 
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Adams does not say whether her veridicality depends 
on the creative power of the human imagination or is, 
instead, independent of human desires, practices, and 
aspirations. In Mont Saint Michel and Chartres, he suggests 
these crucial theological and philosophical questions 
when he asks whether Mary is actual “by way of miracle 
or as a habit of life” (As we will see, he is significantly 
less reticent —or rather, his characters are— in his 
earlier novel, Esther, published in 1884).
In most of the essays collected here I too focus on medieval 
Christianity, particularly on texts in which people claim 
that they or others around them encounter, talk to, see, 
smell, taste, and hear spirits, saints, angels, demons, 
and, of course, God. Any attempt to understand the 
claims made by these writings immediately opens onto 
vital ontological and epistemological questions. What 
does it mean to say that the object of religious devotion 
is real? If something is real are propositions about it also 
true? If such propositions are true, in what way are they 
so?2 If we posit the veridicality of the saints, angels, 
demons, and God encountered by medieval Christians, 
and hence the truth of claims about them, are we 
simply acknowledging the creative power of the human 
imagination or are we asserting that these entities exist 
independently of human practice?
Today, those working in the human sciences have become 
adept at distinguishing between what is real for the 
people they study and what is real for some putatively 
generalizable “us”. Calls for imagination, empathy, and 
respect generally fall short, explicitly or implicitly, from 
assertions that what is real for religious people is also 
true, at least in the sense of that term generally presumed 
by contemporary historians. A number of scholars in 
religious studies argue that for medieval people, Mary is 
real; they cede, furthermore, that pre-modern Christians 
believed Mary to be irreducible to human knowledge, 
practice, or desire. Yet the methodological skepticism and 
agnosticism of modern Western historical methods (and 
much of modern Western philosophy as well) generally 
require that we deny or bracket the question of whether 
it is true for us that Mary, as Virgin Queen of Heaven, 
exists or existed —of whether she is or was an ontological 
2 For more on the variety of ways in which something can be said to be 
true, see my essays “Acute Melancholia”, “Queering the Beguines” 
and “Practice, Belief, and the Feminist Philosophy of Religion”, 
all included here. For the moment, I am focused on what many if 
not most Christians mean when they talk about the reality of their 
religious engagements and the truth of Christian claims, which are 
ineluctably tied to historical claims. On this see my “Reading as Self-
Annihilation”, also collected here.
force in the world independent of human practices and 
relationships. In Adams’ terms, the modern world is 
ready for atheism, perhaps even unable to think critically 
and coherently outside of its terms. Mary may be very real 
for believers, but the claim that Mary existed or exists as 
an independent being is at worst untrue and at best one 
the historian, given the constraints of her field and its 
methodologies, cannot answer.
Lest we think that the distinction between the real and 
the true— between that which an individual palpably 
experiences and hence inexorably takes to be the case 
and what is the case from the standpoint of a third 
party witness— is a thoroughly modern one, there is 
ample evidence that such a distinction was operative 
within the Christian Middle Ages. Not every vision 
was understood to be a vision of God or of demons; 
sometimes, medieval authors view the visionary as sick, 
deluded, or insane3 (Sometimes, even, people made up 
stories to entertain and astonish others; and sometimes, 
of course, they lied).4 And yet the desire to move from 
compelling experience —what is palpably real for the 
one who undergoes it— to claims for independently 
verifiable truth of that which is experienced seems 
inexorable. History as a discipline in the modern West is 
premised on a critical engagement with this movement. 
It is precisely here that the following essays pause.
The true and the real are intimately tied, in the modern 
human sciences —or, in terms more often used in 
the contemporary academy, in the humanities and 
social sciences— to the practice of critique.5 So with 
the questions outlined above also comes the question 
of whether history is necessarily a critical endeavor, 
with critique understood in a quite specific way.6 The 
3 I discuss the issue further in the third part of this essay.
4 Gabrielle M. Spiegel has done vital work on the question of 
historical truth in the Middle Ages. Gabrielle M. Spiegel (1995; 
1999; 2005.) As medievalists well know, however, historical truth 
is only one kind of truth and a relatively devalued one within the 
Christian medieval context. For more on this issue, see Monika 
Otter (1996); Elizabeth (2005); Catherine Sanok (2007); and Robert 
Bartlett (2013). For wonderful work on related issues as they emerge 
in the study of visual culture, see Cynthia Hahn (2001; 2013). For 
an early discussion of the issue of lying, see Augustine, Lying and 
Against Lying, both in Augustine, Treatises on Various Subjects, trans. 
Mary Sarah Muldowney and others, ed. Roy J. Deferrari (1952, 53-
110, 125-179). Also see Paul J. Griffiths (2004).
5 For more on this issue, see my “On Gender, Agency, and the Divine 
in Feminist Historiography”, collected here; and Amy Hollywood 
(2009, 865-878).
6 In “Reading as Self-Annihilation”, collected here, I ask a number 
of questions that are always in the back of my mind when thinking 
about critique. Key is the issue of the potential historical contingency 
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critical historian stubbornly pushes against unreflective 
acceptance of her sources, continually testing them 
against each other in order to sort out the true from 
the false. This is work in which I have an enormous 
investment, as a number of the essays collected here 
attest. For Adams, it is one of the crucial distinctions 
between what he calls the science of history and 
antiquarianism. The other key factor for Adams is that 
history, to be scientific, must be theoretical. It must, he 
insists, give an account of history as a unified whole; 
the antiquarian, on the other hand, is content with 
fragments.7 Adams did not hesitate to argue for the 
reality, the actuality, and the truth of Mary for medieval 
Christians, but he is able to do so because he assumes 
that she is no longer an active presence in the world.
As should be obvious to contemporary readers, Henry 
Adams’ insistence that Mary was a real force in the 
Christian Middle Ages but that she is not in early 
twentieth-century America ignores the persistence, in 
his own time, of claims that spirits, ancestors, saints, 
angels, and deities are present in the world and that they 
play a vital role in the experience of those who encounter 
them.8 Of course, such claims persist into the present. 
Christianity did not lose all of its force in modernity, 
nor have other religious traditions that have come into 
contact with the modernizing and secularizing power 
of certain forms of modern Western rationality. Nor did 
of Western conceptions of critique in the face of the historical claims 
and historical dubiety of much of the Bible. Would the term criticism 
carry such destructive resonance in the Western academy if the 
Hebrew and Christian Bibles had been more “reliable” documents? 
To what extent does this unreliability depend on the peculiarly 
historical claims made by these documents and the traditions that 
arise from them? Or is it a feature of reason to attack, such that any 
document of faith would have been found wanting?
7 On Adams view of history see the late historiographical essays, 
“The Tendency of History”, A Letter to American Teachers of History, and 
“The Rule of Phase Applied to History”, all of which were collected 
together in Henry Adams, with an introduction by Brooks Adams 
(1919). While many still share the first of Adams’s assumptions, 
the second tends to fall out of sight in contemporary historical and 
historiographical work, although as I will argue here, naturalism 
and empiricism are generally assumed.
8 This is true, of course, not only for nineteenth-century American 
Catholics, but also for Protestant evangelicals and many others 
across the spectrum of Christianity and at its edges, in Spiritualism 
and related movements. Positing the childlike character of these 
forms of religion, as contrasted to the maturity of those ready 
for atheism, an assessment often implicit in Adams, is morally, 
politically, and intellectually inadequate. On Catholicism and the 
Protestant responses to Catholicism that create the background 
against which Adams writes, see Jenny Franchot (1994). For the 
fascination with Catholicism at the turn of the last century, and 
for more on Adams’ own complex relationship to religion, see T. 
J. Jackson Lears (1981). For the varieties of religious experience in 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century America, see Ann Taves (1999).
Christianity become, as some hoped, a fully rational or 
naturalized religion. So while it may be true, as Charles 
Taylor argues, that in the pre-modern West atheism was 
not a live option and that the modern West is governed 
by a social imaginary in which what Taylor calls the 
supernatural does not necessarily play a role, the fact 
remains that in almost every part of the world people 
continue to engage in religious practices and to make 
claims about their experience of and encounters with 
modes of being irreducible to the human.9 Questions 
Adams thought he could relegate to the past are very 
much alive in the present; for many in modernity, both 
the Virgin and the Dynamo are real.
In a number of the essays collected here, I ask what it 
might look like if we were to entertain the notion that 
what others encounter as real might also be true, not 
just for them and not solely as a force generated by acts 
of the human imagination. Most importantly, I want to 
ask whether the methods others —in this case religious 
people of a particular sort, those who encounter and 
interact with ghosts, spirits, saints, demons, or 
God— use to determine what is real and what is true 
might challenge the ontological and epistemological 
presuppositions of modern history, themselves 
grounded in central presumptions of modern Western 
philosophy.10 For whether we acknowledge it or not, 
9 See Charles Taylor (2007). Many of Taylor’s arguments in the book 
have been hotly contested, particularly the notion that the shift in 
social imaginaries he describes marks the end result of a process of 
disenchantment. For Taylor’s rewriting of Weber’s thesis, see A Secular 
Age, but also Michael Warner, Jonathan Van Antwerpen, and Craig 
Calhoun (2013) and Judith Butler, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, 
and Cornell West (2011). For a very different account of secularism, 
one that contests some of Taylor’s fundamental claims, see Talal 
Asad (2003); Charles Hirschkind and David Scott (2006); and Talal 
Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood (2013).
10 My work here is deeply indebted to, but slightly diverges from, 
that of Robert Orsi. In a series of important essays Orsi argues for 
the necessity of an “abundant history” or “abundant empiricism” 
that is able to contend with the “real presence” of spirits, saints, 
gods, demons, and ancestors in the lives of religious people. Citing 
important work by the anthropologists Stanley Tambiah and 
Gananeth Obeyesekere and the historian Dipesh Chakrabarty, among 
others, Orsi points to the necessity of finding “a vocabulary for the 
kinds of mental and bodily processes that go on among humans in the 
company of each other and of their gods and other special beings.” 
“But belief”, Orsi insists in another essay, “has nothing to do with 
it.” If by belief, we mean the mere assent to a proposition, Orsi is 
certainly right. However, I would contend that belief means much 
more than this and that it is always in play in the kinds of religious 
experiences to which Orsi points. He goes on to explain that he is 
interested in thinking about how “the really real comes to be so” and 
in moving beyond the claim that an experience is real for the one 
who undergoes it to find “presence, existence, and power in space 
and time”. This leads him to ask how these presences become “as real 
as guns and stones and bread, and then how the real in turns acts as 
Revista de Estudios Sociales No. 51 • rev.estud.soc. • Pp. 300.
ISSN 0123-885X • Bogotá, enero - marzo de 2015 • Pp. 228-240.
230
there is a theory —there are many theories— underlying 
contemporary historical work and the study of religion, 
most prominently a kind of naturalist empiricism that 
assumes everything in human history can be explained 
in terms of the operations of the natural world and of 
human beings, themselves a part of that world.11 Truth is 
unquestioningly identified with empirical truth, which 
in discussions of the human means either scientific 
or historical truth, a historical truth that is assumed 
to operate in naturalistic terms (I discuss this more in 
“Gender, Agency, and the Divine”).
To push against these presumptions —or in my case 
to allow the texts I study to push against them —
entails real risks; we know that the presences —and 
absences— that populate the worlds in which we live 
give rise to confusion, conflict, and violence, as well as 
to the certainty, security, and joy for which Adams was 
nostalgic. Reason, articulated broadly within Western 
modernity as entailing the verifiability of belief by 
independent observers, has been essential to keeping 
certain kinds of conflict in check. From this standpoint, 
many contemporary scholars of religion assume that 
the best we can do is to acknowledge that religion is 
the product —often the very vital and active product— 
of human acts of the imagination; this is as real, many 
imply, as we can allow religion to be.
This is probably closer to what I think that my argument 
thus far would suggest, and yet there is an important, 
if subtle, difference. The clearest articulation of my 
current views can be found in “Acute Melancholia.” It 
appears in the form of a fiction that insists on leaving 
room for something irreducible to individual or 
collective acts of the imagination. I there tentatively 
an agent for itself in history”. Part of what is at work here is the belief 
that one’s experience is not imaginary or fictional or mistaken, but 
rather that it corresponds to something ontologically independent 
of the one having the experience. In other words, it entails belief, 
although of a much more robust kind than that which Orsi eschews 
as the focus of religious studies. In rejecting the category of belief, 
I worry that Orsi renders it impossible to deal with the issues of 
deception and conflicting experiences that I point to in a number of 
the essays included here. For a similar worry, see Stephen Prothero 
(2004); Thomas Kselman (2008, 16-18); and Elizabeth A. Pritchard 
(2010, 1087-1111). For the first citation from Orsi, see Robert A. Orsi, 
(2011, 15). For the second two, see Robert A. Orsi (2007, 45). See also 
Robert A. Orsi, (2003, 169-174); Robert A. Orsi (2004); Robert A. Orsi 
(2008, 12-16); Robert A. Orsi (2011b, 84-105); and Robert A. Orsi (2012, 
80-83). For a captivating attempt to think with Orsi that also moves 
in slightly different directions from him, see Constance M. Furey 
(2008, 22-25). For important work on these issues from the standpoint 
of Santería, see Aisha Mahina Beliso-De Jesús (forthcoming).
11 Adams himself struggled with and against precisely this theory. See 
Lears (1981, 262-297).
hold out the possibility of a transcendence that occurs 
between people, or between people and the world around 
them, and yet is irreducible to the various parties in the 
relationship, perhaps even to the relationship itself.12 
I hesitate to give a solely humanist and naturalizing 
account of religion because of my own experience, as 
“Acute Melancholia” attempts to show, but also because 
of my study of Christianity and my desire to understand 
what it is in Christianity, as in other religious traditions, 
that resists humanistic, naturalizing accounts.
My project in these essays, then, is not governed in any 
simple sense by nostalgia for a lost historical past; the 
vitality of Christianity —and of many other religions— 
surrounds me, even if I do not share in its practices and 
often find them, in their contemporary forms, dull or 
repugnant. Like the anthropologist Saba Mahmood, 
whose work plays an important role in my thinking, my 
concerns are political and ethical —I would add, given 
my own training and predilections, theological and 
philosophical. As an anthropologist, Mahmood takes 
the living women and men whom she studies not only 
as objects of analysis, but also as subjects able to offer 
meaningful accounts of their own practices. Again, at 
stake is not nostalgia for some putatively lost religious 
past, but instead an ethically and politically motivated 
encounter with living religious subjects. Mahmood asks, 
together with a host of other scholars in the study of 
religion, whether we can have a meaningful engagement 
with subjects whose self-understanding we presume from 
the outset to be false or misguided. How can we begin with 
such assumptions and ever hope to understand?
In a recent issue of the Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, Elizabeth A. Pritchard condemns a number 
of scholars who pursue this line of inquiry (although 
curiously not Mahmood). Pritchard argues that Robert 
Orsi and myself abnegate the responsibility of critique. 
Rather than contending with the crucial differences 
between religious people, she argues, the stance of 
openness to the other is in danger of becoming merely 
another liberal plea for tolerance in which real conflict 
is ignored or —even worse— a self-satisfied and self-
satisfying exercise in intellectual masochism.13 Focusing 
her attention on my essay, “Gender, Agency, and the 
Divine in Feminist Historiography”, collected here, and 
Orsi’s “Snakes Alive: Resituating the Moral in the Study 
12 See also Constance M. Furey (2012b, 201-224; 2012a, 7-33; 2012c, 328-340).
13 Pritchard (2010, 1087-1111). Mahmood perhaps does not appear 
because she offers an account of critique in the opening of her book, 
one to which I will return.
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of Religion”, to which I refer in a footnote of that essay, 
Pritchard generalizes from quite specific cases.14 In the 
two essays, Orsi and I both ask questions about what it 
might mean to suspend judgment, at least temporarily, 
as part of an ethical mode of listening.
In his discussion of Appalachian snake handlers, Orsi 
may be subject to Pritchard’s first charge. He asks his 
readers to defer judgments about his subjects, even as 
they voice and enact virulent misogyny. Yet Orsi is an 
historian and he argues that the historian must bracket 
the phenomena to be studied in order to come to as rich 
an understanding of them as possible. Easy judgments, 
he contends, stand in the way of understanding. On this 
reading, Orsi does not claim that critique is impossible, 
but simply that it is not what historians do (I raise 
questions about the possibility of maintaining that 
distinction in a number of essays, as does Orsi himself). 
He also suggests, quite rightly, that any well-grounded 
critique must be premised on as rich an understanding 
of the phenomena in question as possible and that such 
understanding depends on a suspensive moment like 
that undertaken in good historical work.15 As to the 
second charge, I admit to an unfortunate word choice 
when, in “Gender, Agency, and the Divine in Religious 
Historiography”, I urge scholars of religion to allow 
themselves to be “pierced” by the presumptions of those 
they study. The Christian resonances of self-sacrifice 
are, perhaps, a little too strong. Challenged would have 
done the trick argumentatively, if not affectively. But 
Pritchard’s argument goes more deeply than this.
Pritchard insists that in “Gender, Agency, and the Divine 
in Religious Historiography” I renounce critique (She is 
careful to note that the historian Dipesh Chakarabarty, 
with whose work I engage in the essay, does maintain the 
necessity of critique even as he asks what it would mean 
to occupy the time of those for whom the gods are active 
in history). This is inaccurate, but in an interesting and 
a telling way. I do maintain the necessity of critique 
in the ways in which Chakrabarty uses the term; for 
14 See Robert Orsi (2005, 177-204). Unlike most of Orsi’s work, this 
essay does not depend on his own engagements, historical and 
ethnographic, with religious communities, but is a critical 
engagement with the journalistic study of snake handling done by 
Dennis Covington. Orsi’s larger point is a methodological and ethical 
one about the study of religion and liberal attitudes toward religion 
endemic to the U.S. academia and press. See Dennis Covington 
(1995). For Orsi in a more critically engaged set of interactions with 
those he studies, see Robert Orsi (1998).
15 For a similar defense of Orsi against the charges raised by Pritchard 
and Prothero, see Tyler Roberts (2013, 111-118).
Chakrabarty critique is essential to emancipatory 
political projects. But I also ask —and at that point it 
appears very much in the form of a question—whether 
religious practice and discourse might themselves be sites 
from which critique emanates. Unlike Chakrabarty, 
who suggests that critique is the result of a particular 
historical moment, in his case rendered in explicitly 
Marxist terms, I ask whether critical challenges to the 
way things are and creative hope for how the world 
might be —all fundamental, on my view, to critique— 
might not come from religion itself.
For not all critique is secular, nor is it always grounded 
in secular accounts of what constitutes reason. My views 
on the topic became clearer to me a number of years ago, 
when I was invited by Saba Mahmood to participate in 
a symposium asking the question, “Is Critique Secular?” 
My most immediate response was that it was both a 
provocative —and a provocatively stupid—question.16 
This is precisely why it is such a crucial one; hence also 
the importance of Pritchard’s essay. A lot of people will 
think the answer to the question, “is critique secular”, is 
obvious. Yet whether that obvious answer is “no” or “yes” 
depends entirely on who is answering the question and 
what they take the terms critique and secular to mean, 
as well as how they understand religion. Many within 
the academy, as I suspected when I first approached the 
question and as subsequent commentary demonstrates, 
find the question redundant, presuming that critique 
is defined in terms of its secularity and vice versa.17 For 
those who presume that critique is always the critique 
of something, that this something is associated with 
a putatively unquestioned authority, and that religion 
is, in its very nature, grounded in an unquestioned and 
unquestioning appeal to such an authority, critique and 
secularity are mutually interdependent phenomena.18 
16 For an extension of part of the discussion that took place that day, see 
Asad et al. (2013). As they authors note, they do not try to answer the 
question directly.
17 For this assumption rendered explicit, see Wendy Brown (2013) and 
Stathis Gourgouris (2008, 445). Saba Mahmood robustly argues 
against Gourgouris in “Is Critique Secular?: A Symposium at UC 
Berkeley”, Public Culture 20: 3 (2008): 450. The problem with Brown’s 
account, which does include the possibility that the notion of the 
secular might itself require critique, is that it identifies critique 
only with the philosophical deployment of the term in the tradition 
running from Kant to Marx and Critical Theory. As I suggest here 
and in a number of the essays included here, there is more to critique 
than this truncated, albeit essential, history.
18 Hence in Brown’s account, Kant employed critique to limit reason’s 
claims and to insure that a properly chastened reason, rather than 
religion, will be the source of authority in intellectual and moral 
pursuits. What this misses is that for Kant, even a properly chastened 
reason needs religion, although one that lies “within the boundaries 
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One might even push this a step further and suggest that, 
for those who would answer the question “is critique 
secular?” with an unqualified “yes”, the appeal to any 
authority other than reason is always, in some way, 
religious. From this perspective the transmutation of 
physical force into authority has been called theological 
or mystical, and hence has been seen as participating in 
an irrationality associated with religion.19
There are those, then, who insist that critique is 
antithetical to religion, given the putative rationality 
of the former and irrationality of the latter. To these 
secularist critics of religion I find myself asking how 
anyone can possibly look at Christianity —just to give an 
example close to home— and claim that its practitioners 
do not engage in critique.20 One can think very quickly 
of examples across the political spectrum, from the long 
history of Christian protest against war to Christian 
activism in pursuit of the repeal of Rowe v. Wade. And 
of course, there are Christians who embrace and make 
religious arguments for war and Christians who pursue 
the cause of women’s reproductive freedom21 (The 
diversity and complexity of Christian positions on any 
given topic renders assumptions about what Christians, 
as a putative whole, think or do moot). Yes, a certain 
kind of secularist interlocutor might respond, but the 
social, political, moral, and theoretical critique of 
authority leveled by Christians is always tendered either 
on grounds other than those specific to Christianity or 
on the unquestioned authority of Christianity itself. 
Yet the first assertion is false. Christians critique that 
which lies outside the domain of Christianity on the 
of mere reason.” For Kant religion’s authority depends on reason’s 
claims, yet the power to activate the will in the moral life depends, 
in obscure ways, on aesthetic and religious impulses. Hence the vexed 
role of enthusiasm across Kant’s corpus, a subject on which I am 
currently working. See Brown, “Introduction”, in Is Critique Secular?
19 Whether this is good, bad, or simply inevitable is the subject of heated 
debate. The provenance of the move in very different and politically 
diametrically opposed thinkers, Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin, 
demonstrates this clearly. The bibliography on the topic is vast and 
growing, but for an introduction to some of the relevant issues, see 
Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (2006). The volume has the 
advantage of understanding that Carl Schmitt did not invent “political 
theology”, nor is his usage about theology; instead, he uses the term to 
describe the putatively hidden theological source of secular power.
20 For a specific and compelling example, see Constance M. Furey 
(2014, 254-272).
21 For compelling examples of Christian and Jewish activism from the 
left, see Jeffrey Stout (2010). For Stout, however, it is essential that 
anyone participating in democracy be willing and able to make 
explicit their positions in terms available to all those operating 
within that democracy. But who determines what constitutes and 
who determines those terms? See Stout’s important book, Democracy 
and Tradition (2004).
basis of specifically Christian claims all the time —this 
is precisely what bothers so many about Christianity in 
the contemporary United States.
To the second one must ask what it means to talk about 
the authority of Christianity. The authority of the Bible, 
some might be tempted to reply. Yet there is not now nor 
has there ever been any agreement among Christians 
about what it means to speak of the authority of the 
Bible or even about what constitutes the Bible, to say 
nothing of what this contested entity tells Christians 
they ought to do or think (or even whether it does so 
and if it does so, how). Some of the earliest Christian 
creedal formulations claim explicitly that the Bible is 
not the ultimate source of authority for Christians (A 
number of other candidates are put forward, including 
the very formulae themselves —just the kind of putative 
circularity religion’s contemporary despisers love to 
exploit. Note that I am not making any claim here for the 
rationality of Christian belief, but simply for its critical 
and self-critical capacities). Every one of these issues has 
been and continues to be contested among those who 
call themselves Christians.
In other words, Christians continually critique 
Christianity and that which lies outside its boundaries. 
They constantly contest even what it means to be a 
Christian. And the same can be said for every other 
religion about which I know anything. It is difficult to 
see how a tradition could stay alive and vital without 
such contestation, however implicit and unremarked on 
it might be. As for the boundary between Christianity 
and the world, in the Latin West a distinction was 
made early on between the “city of God” and the “city of 
humanity”, but Augustine, who most famously argues 
the point, insists that the former can never fully be 
known as long as we are residents in the latter.22 For 
Augustine, the two can never be entirely disentangled 
in the present time (saeculum, the temporal realm, as 
opposed to the eternal, of which we only have obscure 
glimpses). What this means concretely is that Christians 
stand in a critical relationship to the temporal realm 
from the perspective of hope given in things as yet 
only dimly known, not from the standpoint of fully 
present and authoritative knowledge23 (There are, of 
course, Christians who will disagree, who claim that 
there is a self-evident and inerrant source of Christian 
22 The crucial text is, of course, Augustine (2003).
23 From this perspective, the robust self-confidence of religion’s 
contemporary despisers might easily be taken for idolatrous fideism.
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teaching and that they know exactly what it is and what 
it demands. Some of those about whom I write in the 
following essays stand among this group, although far 
fewer than one might suppose. Furthermore, I am not a 
Christian and so might be judged by some incompetent 
to participate in the debate. Yet the Christian tradition 
and contemporary Christian practice —which does not 
always align with what contemporary Christians say 
about what they do— bears out my view).24
Yet despite all of the evidence to the contrary, the 
position persists, even within the study of religion, that 
religion is inherently uncritical, authoritarian, and 
ideological. This is the primary assumption of those 
who insist that the study of religion purify itself of all 
theological remnants and that it be rigorously scientific 
or historical. In an extremely helpful intervention, 
Encountering Religion: Responsibility and Criticism After Secularism, 
Tyler Roberts makes the cogent point that these 
arguments depend on a notion of religion as locative.25 
Roberts borrows the term from J. Z. Smith, who uses 
it to describe Mircea Eliade’s understanding of religion 
as “affirming and repeating the basic order of the 
world, firmly locating or placing people by repressing 
the creativity of chaos, denying change, and stressing 
‘dwelling within a limited world’”.26 Yet Roberts points 
out that Smith also offers another account of religion, 
for Smith distinguishes between a locative vision of 
religion, like that he finds in Eliade, and a utopian one.
To cite Roberts once again, for Smith
the second vision emphasizes rebellion against and 
freedom from established order. Smith calls it a “utopian” 
vision of the world: where the locative vision focuses on 
place, the utopian affirms the value of being in no place. 
Both, he claims, are “coeval existential possibilities”.27
According to Roberts, Smith’s second understanding of 
religion shifts across the essays collected in Map is Not 
Territory from utopian to liminal. Roberts is most compelled 
by Smith’s account of religion as capable of engaging with 
disorder, incongruity, and excess; religion understood in 
24 For the limits of a religious nation’s knowledge about their own and 
other traditions, see Amy Hollywood (2011, 460-466).
25 Roberts takes on scholars as diverse —although united on the point 
of religion’s locative nature— as Russell McCutchean, Donald Wiebe, 
Ivan Strenski, Russelll McCutcheon, and Bruce Lincoln. See Roberts 
(2007, 36-82).
26 Roberts (2007, 26-27); Roberts cites J. Z. Smith (1978, 100).
27 Roberts (2007, 27); Roberts here cites Smith (1978, 101).
this way, according to Roberts, “neither rejects one order 
for another nor revises an old order”. It is “neither locative or 
utopian” but instead “relativizes all order”.28 I cannot follow 
Roberts’ in distinguishing so sharply between the utopian 
and the excessive, for the utopian rejection of an old order 
of necessity relativizes all order and the relativization of 
order can itself be understood as utopian. But Roberts’ 
primary point —that religion operates in ways that are 
both locative and excessive— is enormously helpful in the 
context of contemporary debates in the study of religion.
Against those scholars of religion who assume that 
religion is always about order, stability, and authority, 
then, Roberts asks whether an overemphasis on “locative 
religion” has
prevented us from pursuing more fully other questions: 
Can religious people play religiously? Can they recognize 
absurdity in and through their religious thought and 
practice and, if so, how? Do they always, necessarily, 
“speak” with transcendent and eternal authority when 
they speak of God or about their religious beliefs? Can 
they think critically when they think religiously? Finally, 
if so, where and how, exactly, do we draw the boundary 
between religion and the academic study of religion?29
My answer to these questions is obvious: of course 
religious people play religiously, can recognize absurdity, 
and think critically while thinking religiously. The 
essays collected here show numerous examples of 
religious people doing precisely these things, all the 
while both claiming and subverting their own claims 
to transcendent and eternal authority in their talk 
about God. Roberts also uses the conception of religion 
as excessive, as unsettling boundaries, norms, and 
authorities, to show that locative accounts of religion 
are inadequate to their object and that forms of critique 
embraced by many locativists can be found among 
religious people, even theologians (His favorite example 
here is Rowan Williams, who continually emphasizes 
the need for humility in claims about God and the 
nature of reality).30 This is a vital contribution to the 
study of religion, for it enables scholars to articulate 
the different ways in which religious texts, practices, 
and communities work, and to see and name the almost 
infinite variety of things that religions do.
28 Roberts (2007, 30).
29 Roberts (2007, 41).
30 See, for example, Rowan Williams (1990; 2000; 2002). I am not myself 
sure that Williams’ emphasize on epistemic humility embraces 
excess and destabilizes order in quite the way Roberts suggests.
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I also agree with Roberts’ assertion that the study of 
religion can and should be not only descriptive, but 
also constructive (This is not to say that every scholar 
of religion will bring together the various aspects of 
its study, but instead that constructive theological 
and philosophical work is properly part of the study of 
religion and cannot and should not be ejected from the 
conversation). To this end, Roberts turns to the work 
of Hent de Vries, Eric Santner, and Stanley Cavell to 
think through what an “affirmative criticism” might 
entail. There are powerful accounts of responsibility, 
responsiveness, and gratitude in these pages, all of 
which speak to our work as scholars and to the broader 
questions of how we might best live. The pages on 
Cavell and gratitude are particularly important, yet 
they are also the most distant from religion. Perhaps 
more crucially, Roberts embraces de Vries conception 
of philosophy itself as a form of “minimal theology”, a 
“restless wakefulness” and “infinite responsibility” in 
which thought is always in excess of itself.31 Although 
Roberts deploys Santner and Cavell in an attempt to 
overcome the seemingly hopeless and unending task 
of critique to which we are enjoined by de Vries, the 
resources for doing so again come primarily from outside 
of religion.32 The only religion useful to the secular 
critic, Roberts suggests, is excessive and destabilizing. 
Religion as locative, as providing a space in which to live 
and to breath, has once again been banished.
We seem to be far from those who insist that critique 
is, of necessity, secular, since for de Vries and Roberts, 
religion, at its best, is critique. What de Vries and 
Roberts share with secular advocates of critique is 
an understanding of critique as destabilizing and 
unsettling. There are good reasons for this seemingly 
paradoxical conjunction of positions. The critics 
of Christianity most often cited as the source of 
contemporary Western philosophical conceptions of 
critique —Immanuel Kant, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl 
Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche, among many others— 
all understood Christianity itself as a vital source of the 
impulse toward critique. A presumption runs through 
parts of the modern European philosophical tradition 
that the self-critical nature of Christianity leads —or 
will lead— to the radical revision of Christianity or to its 
dissolution (and with it, the dissolution of all religion) 
(This final turn of the screw appears most explicitly in 
Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. John Locke 
31 Williams (2002, 158 and 161).
32 Williams (2002, 168).
and Immanuel Kant, for example, had no intention of 
dissolving Christianity, which both of them believed 
to be congruent with rational claims). Embedded 
here are claims both for the supremacy of Christianity 
(sometimes Judaism instead or as well) over all other 
religious traditions and an association of Christianity 
with the emergent secular realm, one in which rational 
argument is said to take the place of irrational faith (In 
the terms provided by Augustine, then, Christian self-
critique leads to the recognition that all we have is the 
temporal [saeculum]; there is no eternal realm and it is 
irrational to believe that there is). Christianity, according 
to this account, is both irrational and the ground out of 
which rationality emerges.
In one version of this argument, the secular looks a 
lot like liberal Protestant Christianity —sometimes 
shorn of its explicitly Christian trappings, sometimes 
not. Irrational, authoritarian, bad Christianity is 
then identified with Roman Catholicism and, often, 
the radical reformation. Since the early modern 
period, the battle has also been staged as one between 
irrational fanaticism (Catholics again are among the 
chief culprits) and rational belief. Yet regardless of the 
distinctions made —between rationality and fanaticism, 
paganism and true religion, Protestantism and Roman 
Catholicism— a paradox remains at the center of some of 
the most influential modern accounts of the dissolution 
of religion, for in Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, and 
Freud somehow the irrational begets the rational. On 
this account, critique is both secular and theological, 
for religion (or at least Christianity) gives rise to —even 
fuels— that which stands in opposition to it.33
For despite the desire that rational discourse be 
undertaken in a spirit of calm and order, modern 
western rationality bears within it the marks of a 
purificatory fervor. In its endless demands, critique 
is itself fanatical. From this standpoint, a certain 
33 A number of secularist critics of religion —some of those with the 
biggest audiences, like Daniel Dennett or Kathe Pollitt, but also 
those internal to religious studies like Russell McCutcheon —want 
to bypass this entire historical narrative, both in terms of the history 
of anti-religious critique within the modern West and in terms of the 
role of religion itself within that critique. For these critics there are 
scientific grounds for rejecting religious belief and modern scientific 
reasoning owes nothing to Western —or any other— religion. 
Despite its ubiquity, this is an exceptionally hard argument to make. 
I cannot here demonstrate all of the difficulties involved, but merely 
point to the fact that for innumerable modern philosophers who 
argue against either fanaticism specifically or against Christianity 
and religion more generally, Christianity plays a key role in the 
constitution of modern rationality.
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implacability is visible even in Mahmood’s capacious 
account of what constitutes critique. Mahmood urges 
“an expansion of normative understandings of critique”. 
Whereas on the old view criticism “is about successfully 
demolishing your opponent’s position and exposing 
the implausibility of her argument and its logical 
inconsistencies”, she argues that
critique ... is most powerful when it leaves open the 
possibility that we might also be remade in the process 
of engaging with another’s worldview, that we might 
come to learn things that we did not already know 
before we undertook the engagement. This requires 
that we occasionally turn the critical gaze upon 
ourselves, to leave open the possibility that we may be 
remade through an encounter with the other.34
Note here that critique as critique of something does 
not disappear, but instead is turned against one’s own 
presuppositions. I stand by my assertion that the move 
is essential to contemporary political and cultural 
criticism and yet, from whence this relentlessness? 
Are there times when critique, understood as a form of 
intellectual ascesis, is not enough?
Roberts, who follows de Vries in positing a theological 
and religious origin for the relentlessly destabilizing 
force of critique, turns to philosophy for remedy and 
respite. Within this context, religion is most compelling 
as critical and excessive, less so as locative; the two 
aspects of religion seem at odds with each other in ways 
Roberts does not fully explore.35 What I want to suggest 
here is that a different deployment of the concept 
of excess, one that draws directly on the work of the 
34 Saba Mahmood (2005, 36-37). Michel Foucault’s and Judith 
Butler’s accounts of critique arguably lead to a position very close 
to Mahmood’s. At their most explicit, they both define critique, 
like the rationalist critiques of religion I describe above, as the 
critique of authoritative traditions and norms. What they contest 
is the presumption that rationally based arguments or claims 
to authority can escape the dynamics of power. They go on, 
however, to suggest that critique is a virtue in ways that bring 
their arguments close to that of Mahmood. See Michel Foucault 
(1997); and Judith Butler (2002).
35 Roberts does include discussion of work that draws on the Christian 
theological tradition, including a generous reading of some of 
my own previous work. But when he turns toward the kind of 
responsive criticism in which he is interested, he names the 
project philosophical and rests his account on the work of de Vries 
(a philosopher of religion and theologian), Santner (a literary critic 
and theorist), and Cavell (a philosopher). The work on Santner and 
Cavell is compelling. My real problems with this part of the book, as 
I will show, are less problems with Roberts than with de Vries and 
the ways in which Roberts relies on and allows de Vries to ground his 
constructive philosophical project.
philosopher Jacques Derrida as well as on the Christian 
tradition, might help us think about the relationship 
between the locative and the critical aspects of religion 
in fresh ways. Religion might then be understood as 
providing rich resources with which to do the work of 
responsive criticism in which Roberts is interested.
For Roberts reading de Vries reading Derrida, “the 
religious exceeds the historical” in the very process of 
handing down, that is, of tradition itself:
one responds to the past, as tradition or heritage, in a 
repetition that, if it is to be responsible, is faithful to the 
past even as it exceeds and betrays it in a performance of 
singularity, an “event” of “irreducible prescriptivity.” 
Such testimony involves a complex performative, or a 
“perveraformative”, speech act that is both a following 
of or adhering to and a perversion of this past, a faithful 
interpretation and a singular invention.36
There are at least two problems with this account in 
addition to the worry Roberts himself has with its 
purely negative conception of critique and responsibility 
(Again this worry runs parallel to my own concern about 
the relentlessness of critique). First, de Vries’s reading 
of Derrida is one-sided in much the same way that 
locativist readings of religion are one-sided, although 
what is emphasized and what is ignored differ. Whereas 
the locativist takes religion as solely upholding order, 
stability, and authority, de Vries finds religion of value 
only in its excessive, destabilizing, anti-authoritarian 
form. The move is premised on a reading of Derrida in 
which the claim that repetition always involves both 
sameness and difference (this is the movement of what 
Derrida calls differance, in which spatial and temporal 
otherness is recognized as intrinsic to repetition itself) is 
understood as perversion and infidelity.
Yet in his work from the 1960s, differance is not 
marked by perversion and infidelity —or if it is, it is a 
perversion and an infidelity that Derrida embraces. 
Across his corpus, moreover, he insists that tradition 
exists because of the human capacity to repeat, whether 
linguistic signs, visual images, or bodily practices.37 As 
I argue in “Performativity, Citationality, Ritualization”, 
for Derrida repetition always entails both sameness 
—a practice must be sufficiently like other practices to 
36 Williams (2002, 168). Roberts here cites Hent de Vries (1999, 287; 2002, 
177, 386, 398). Also relevant to this discussion is Hent de Vries (2005).
37 For me the crucial text on tradition is Jacques Derrida (1996). See also 
Amy Hollywood (1999, 150-160).
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be recognizable as the same practice— and different —
the practice, to be repeated, occurs in a different time 
and place than other instances of its enactment.38 The 
difference internal to repetition both enables a tradition 
to be handed down and requires that it change, whether 
that change is recognized or not. Only if we believe that 
we can know the absolute origin of signification —a 
term I use here in its broadest possible sense, to include 
practices and images as well as language— can we be 
said to betray a tradition and our responsibilities to 
it merely through the act of repetition itself.39 Derrida 
argues forcefully that we can never know a pure origin 
and this is something about which a large part of the 
Christian tradition agrees with Derrida.
As Roberts notes in his use of Rowan Williams’s work, 
many if not most Christians insist we can never know 
God with fullness or surety (For some we can never have 
this knowledge while living; for others, we will never 
have it; and for a very few, those, not surprisingly, most 
interesting to Derrida, it is possible that God Godself does 
not know God). The unsaying of the names of God —what 
the sixth-century Syriac monk who goes under the name 
of Dionysius the Areopogite first called apophasis— marks 
the recognition that all human concepts and practices are 
inadequate to the divine.40 God is without limits and so 
escapes all our attempts to know God. Derrida spent a 
considerable amount of energy pointing to the similarities 
and emphasizing the differences between his work and 
that of apophasis.41 What is of most interest to me here, 
however, is that for Dionysius, as for the Christian 
tradition as a whole, apophasis always comes together 
38 My reading focuses on Jacques Derrida (1984), although one could go 
to multiple sites in Derrida’s work.
39 According to Roberts, for de Vries reading Derrida, responsibility 
demands a paradoxical “forgetting without forgetting”, which 
“is a function both of the particular, unique context in which it 
takes place (which is thus dependent on historical chains of ideas 
and circumstances) and of a response, by this speaker or this actor 
here and now, to the singularizing imperative of the absolute. It 
is a kind of crossing or pivot between absolute origin and history, 
autonomy and heteronomy.” Roberts (2007, 167). But of course, for 
Derrida there is no absolute origin and what is being described are 
two moments of singularity, two historical moments that are both 
irreducible to their historicity. This does not make them sites of 
radical autonomy or originarity, but instead always implicated in 
the general movement of the particular.
40 As Andrew Louth usefully reminds us, the practice is biblical. See 
Andrew Louth (2012, 137-146).
41 The key texts are “Difference”, in Margins of Philosophy; “How to Avoid 
Speaking: Denials”, “On an Apocalyptic Tone in Newly Adopted in 
Philosohy”, and “Post-scriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voices”, all 
collected in Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (1992); and “Passions” 
and “Khora”, collected together with “Post-scriptum” in On the Name, 
trans. Thomas DuToit and David Wood (1995).
with what Dionysius called cataphasis, the saying or 
naming of God. For Dionysius, cataphasis and apophasis 
are two moments in the movement toward God, two 
moments that together constitute Christianity. Until 
something has been ascribed of God, we cannot unsay 
it; without some conception of God’s goodness or being 
or love, we cannot move to the claim that God is beyond 
goodness or being or love, or that God is unbounded 
goodness or being or love, or that God’s goodness or being 
or love is so unlimited that we cannot think it within 
human conceptions of these attributes.
There is no “apophatic theology” within Christianity, 
then, but only the interplay between cataphasis and 
apophasis. Some emphasize one movement over the 
other. Some bury or forget the one movement in favor 
of the other. Yet when this happens, the liveness of the 
tradition —its very capacity to signify and to be handed 
down— is in danger.42 Arguably this is the problem with 
much academic theology at the moment, whether it 
be Christian or post-Christian, an ugly term that I take 
to mean secular philosophers and theologians deeply 
influenced by the Christian tradition, not unlike myself; 
too many insist that theology be solely cataphatic or 
solely apophatic. In the first instance, the tradition 
is idolized and becomes a dead and inert thing; in the 
second, all ties to a living tradition of practice and faith 
is lost and with it the vitality of human life within those 
traditions (There are enormous problems with the very 
language of this claim, grounded as it is in the Christian 
dismissal of non-Christian religions as idolatrous and 
the refusal to recognize other religions as worshiping 
anything other than dead and inert things. One of the 
most crucial tasks before us now is to find language with 
which to name the liveness of a tradition and whatever 
the opposite of that liveness might be. The language 
most likely will not be new in some absolute sense, but 
handed down from traditions other than Christianity).43
Santner and Cavell, on Roberts’ reading, both point 
to the possibility of a secular theology or philosophy 
of religion in which we look to the everyday world 
and our critical engagements with it as the site of 
theological and existential meaning. As I suggested 
above, in many ways my own work is moving in just 
that direction. Yet because he is intent on following 
42 For a wonderfully Derridean —and more importantly Morrisonian— 
take on the liveness of tradition and what renders it dead, see Toni 
Morrison (1994).
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out a certain kind of philosophical argument, Roberts 
remains focused on abstractions; from whence do we 
receive the concrete traditions that enable us to live? 
Santner and Cavell turn to psychoanalysis, literature, 
and film as sites for reflection on how we might live;44 
for many people, literature, music, film, television, 
and the visual arts are their tradition (And stories. 
Always stories). Yet the resources of Christianity and 
Judaism, as of many other religions, are also available 
to us if we can find ways to keep them alive, even in 
—always necessarily in— changed forms.
This leads to my second worry about Roberts’ argument, 
which is that what is truly excessive within religion may 
be lost (Earlier I posited this in terms of a question about 
whether naturalizing humanistic accounts of religion, 
like the one Roberts ultimately embraces, are adequate 
to their object). One way to read my understanding of 
the cataphatic and the apophatic into Roberts’ work is to 
argue that the cataphatic is locative and the apophatic 
excessive. In terms of Derrida’s understanding of 
signification, the cataphatic and the locative would be 
that which remains the same in the act of repetition, 
whereas the apophatic and the excessive would be the 
movement of difference. Yet I am uneasy with these 
analogies even as I make them. I am not at all sure that 
the cataphatic naming of God and of worlds is purely 
locative or the apophatic purely destabilizing, for the 
distinction between cataphasis and apophasis, unlike 
that between the locative and the excessive, does not 
depend on their opposition. Instead, the two work in 
relationship to each other; the one always requires the 
other. Put in Derridean terms, you cannot repeat without 
both sameness and difference. Hence the importance 
of Derrida’s neologism, differance, which entails both 
sameness and difference, naming and unnaming, 
fidelity and infidelity —or better, fidelity as infidelity 
(Derrida’s inability or refusal properly to understand 
the interplay between the cataphatic and the apophatic 
fuels his own agonized relationship to Christianity in 
particular and religion in general).
Derrida’s writing from at least the 1980s until his death, 
work in which he worries about singularity, rests on his 
recognition that what is released in the interplay between 
sameness and difference is irreducible to any particular 
instantiation of signification or to its general movement. 
Both history and philosophy, insofar as they are governed 
44 As Roberts notes, Santner also turns to Jewish theology, in particular 
the work of Franz Rosenzweig. See Eric Santner (2001).
by the logic of the particular and the general (and hence 
of the generalizable), are inadequate to the experience of 
the gift, of givenness, of grace. Yet this does not mean 
that we can stop trying to name what we receive, what 
we value, and what we desire. We can never free ourselves 
from our debts, yet we can work to understand them and 
to live in the space of creative transformation that is the 
intertwined tasks of tradition and critique, of tradition as critique 
and as always irreducible to critique.
For the real and the true are not determined only 
through the process of critique; finding and creating the 
real and the true, articulating when they converge and 
when they diverge, demands attention to the interplay 
between sameness and difference so vital to the handing 
down, acceptance, and rejection of tradition. To do this 
work we need to be willing to listen, to hear, and to try 
to understand what is; to articulate how what is and 
what was and what will be are always intertwined, even 
as our political and moral commitments may require 
us to disentangle them; and to recognize that there 
are aspects of human experience we will never fully 
capture, never fully understand, never fully name. We 
always and inevitably receive what it is handed down, 
whether religious practices, philosophical texts, or 
Double Indemnity (my mother used to make me watch it 
with her when I was far too small to know what it was 
about). If we are very, very lucky, we are given worlds 
in which we can thrive. Yet our reception of tradition is 
always also a critical engagement with it, and it is that 
gap —the gap between what is handed down and what 
is received— that makes life possible and that makes 
possible the more robust and self-conscious forms of 
critique on which most of our lives depend. Critique 
emerges as a self-conscious modality in those moments 
when we realize that we occupy the world differently —
or desire to occupy the world differently— than at least 
some part of the traditions into which we have been born 
demand45 (The multiplicity of tradition is also in play 
here, for there is always, of necessity, more than one 
way of being handed down, hence opening further the 
space to live differently and to live in critical relationship 
to the traditions that form us). ➻
45 This is the space, then, out of which the possibility for critical 
engagement with systemic evil and injustice emerge. To know 
that we are being told lies and that the tradition (or a part of the 
tradition or one of the many traditions) in which we live is unjust 
require a hold on the real that has also been, in some way, given 
to us. On my reading, this is the space in which the work of Judith 
Butler dwells. For my discussion of Butler, see “Perfomativity, 
Citationality, Ritualization”, included here. See also Judith Butler 
(2004; 2005; 2006, 276-289).
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